Friday, May 5, 2017

Beware! Don't Fall for FireFox "HoeflerText Font Wasn't Found" Banking Malware Scam


firefox-chrome-HoeflerText-font-was-not-found
The malicious scam campaign, "The 'HoeflerText' font wasn't found," is back, which was previously targeting Google Chrome users to trick them into installing Spora ransomware on their computers.

This time the campaign has been re-designed to target Mozilla Firefox users with a banking trojan, called Zeus Panda.

Interestingly, the attackers behind this new campaign are so stupid that they forgot to change the name of the font, i.e. HoeflerText, due to which it was easily caught by Kafeine, a security researcher at Proofpoint.

As I previously warned — Next time when you accidentally land up on a suspicious website with jumbled content prompting to update the Firefox or Chrome font pack by downloading a missing text font to read the article… Just don't download it. It's obviously a trap.

Just like the previous one, the latest Firefox 'HoeflerText font wasn't found scam is also very convincing and easy to fall for.

The attack initiates with an alert message, which states that "The 'HoeflerText' font was not found," asking Firefox users to update their "Mozilla Font Pack."

Once clicked, it downloads a ZIP file (Mozilla_Font_v7.87.zip) on the victim’s system, containing a JavaScript file. Meanwhile, the screen will display a set of instructions, asking victims to run the JS file in order to install the missing "Mozilla Font Pack."

If the victims turned out to be so stupid that they run the JS file themselves, as instructed, the program will download the malware payload (.exe) from a remote server and then runs it automatically, injecting the Zeus Panda banking Trojan into the infected systems.

Panda is an online banking trojan that was initially found to be targeting banks in Europe and North America early last year and then started spreading itself to Brazil through at least three different exploit kits, including Angler, Nuclear, and Neutrino.

Once it infects a system, the Zeus Panda banking trojan contacts its command and control (C&C) server to send the infected device information, including a list of installed antivirus and firewall products.

Panda focuses on stealing banking credentials from users, as well as those of bitcoin exchanges, payment card services and online payments providers, prepaid cards, airline loyalty programs and online betting accounts, to name a few.

To protect yourself from such scams, always exercise caution when downloading anything from the Internet onto your computers. Moreover, keep your antivirus up-to-date and do not ever fall for scam asking you to update your Mozilla or Chrome font pack, as it already comes with everything you need. 

Wang Wei

Saturday, April 29, 2017

Insecure Apps that Open Ports Leave Millions of Smartphones at Risk of Hacking



Thursday, April 20, 2017

The Lack of Food is Not the Cause of the Hunger Problem


The problem has never been the lack of food - but the access to food.
Neel Ghose | TEDxGateway 

Neel is the founder of the Robin Hood Army. Being a finance student and having worked in a New York based hedge fund (D.E. Shaw), Neel looked set for a career in finance – only to realise that he found excel sheets and financial analysis exceptionally boring. This led him to the world of food and startups, and he joined a small passionate team that believed in building a world-class product. Neel is a bit of a nomad and has lived in 8 cities across 5 countries in the last couple of years, setting up operations of the startup Zomato, worldwide.
In his free time, along with his friend Anand, Neel has set up the Robin Hood Army - a volunteer based organisation which collects excess food from restaurants and distributes it to the less fortunate. In a little over two years, the RHA has served over 1.5 million people through over 8000 Robins across 12 countries. He likes to believe that the RHA is just '1% Done'.

This talk was given at a TEDx event using the TED conference format but independently organized by a local community. Learn more at http://ted.com/tedx

Monday, April 10, 2017

Smartphones Using Broadcom Wi-Fi Chip Can Be Hacked OTA


Broadcom-wifi-chipset-hack
Millions of smartphones and smart gadgets, including Apple iOS and many Android handsets from various manufacturers, equipped with Broadcom Wifi chips are vulnerable to over-the-air hijacking without any user interaction.

Just yesterday, Apple rushed out an emergency iOS 10.3.1 patch update to address a serious bug that could allow an attacker within same Wifi network to remotely execute malicious code on the Broadcom WiFi SoC (Software-on-Chip) used in iPhones, iPads, and iPods.

The vulnerability was described as the stack buffer overflow issue and was discovered by Google's Project Zero staffer Gal Beniamini, who today detailed his research on a lengthy blog post, saying the flaw affects not only Apple but all those devices using Broadcom's Wi-Fi stack.

Beniamini says this stack buffer overflow issue in the Broadcom firmware code could lead to remote code execution vulnerability, allowing an attacker in the smartphone's WiFi range to send and execute code on the device.

Attackers with high skills can also deploy malicious code to take full control over the victim's device and install malicious apps, like banking Trojans, ransomware, and adware, without the victim's knowledge.

In his next blog post that's already on its way, Beniamini will explain how attackers can use their assumed control of the Wi-Fi SoC in order to further escalate their privileges into the application processor, taking over the host’s operating system.

Over-the-Air Broadcom Wi-Fi SoC Hack

hack-android-phone
According to the researcher, the firmware running on Broadcom WiFi SoC can be tricked into overrunning its stack buffers, which allowed him to send carefully crafted WiFi frames, with abnormal values, to the Wi-Fi controller in order to overflow the firmware's stack.

Beniamini then combined this value with the frequent timer firings of the chipset to gradually overwrite specific chunks of device's memory (RAM) until his malicious code is executed.

So, to exploit the flaw, an attacker needs to be within the WiFi range of the affected device to silently take over it.
"While the firmware implementation on the Wi-Fi SoC is incredibly complex, it still lags behind in terms of security," Beniamini explains. "Specifically, it lacks all basic exploit mitigations – including stack cookies, safe unlinking and access permission protection."
The researcher also detailed a proof-of-concept Wi-Fi remote code execution exploit in the blog post and successfully performed it on a then-fully updated (now fixed) Nexus 6P, running Android 7.1.1 version NUF26K – the latest available Nexus device at the time of testing in February.

The flaw is one of the several vulnerabilities discovered by Beniamini in the firmware version 6.37.34.40 of Broadcom Wi-Fi chips.

Security Patch for Nexus & iOS Released; Others Have to Wait!


Google Project Zero team reported the issue to Broadcom in December. Since the flaw is in Broadcom's code, smartphone makers had to wait for a patch from the chip vendor before testing the patch and pushing it out to their own user base.

Both Apple and Google addressed the vulnerability with security updates released on Monday, with Google delivering updates via its Android April 2017 Security Bulletin and Apple releasing the iOS 10.3.1 update.

The flaw still affects most Samsung flagship devices, including Galaxy S7 (G930F, G930V), Galaxy S7 Edge (G935F, G9350), Galaxy S6 Edge (G925V), Galaxy S5 (G900F), and Galaxy Note 4 (N910F), the researcher says.
by

Longhorn: Tools used by cyber-espionage group linked to Vault 7

First evidence linking Vault 7 tools to known cyberattacks.

Spying tools and operational protocols detailed in the recent Vault 7 leak have been used in cyberattacks against at least 40 targets in 16 different countries by a group Symantec calls Longhorn. Symantec has been protecting its customers from Longhorn’s tools for the past three years and has continued to track the group in order to learn more about its tools, tactics, and procedures.
The tools used by Longhorn closely follow development timelines and technical specifications laid out in documents disclosed by WikiLeaks. The Longhorn group shares some of the same cryptographic protocols specified in the Vault 7 documents, in addition to following leaked guidelines on tactics to avoid detection. Given the close similarities between the tools and techniques, there can be little doubt that Longhorn's activities and the Vault 7 documents are the work of the same group.

Who is Longhorn?

Longhorn has been active since at least 2011. It has used a range of back door Trojans in addition to zero-day vulnerabilities to compromise its targets. Longhorn has infiltrated governments and internationally operating organizations, in addition to targets in the financial, telecoms, energy, aerospace, information technology, education, and natural resources sectors. All of the organizations targeted would be of interest to a nation-state attacker.
Longhorn has infected 40 targets in at least 16 countries across the Middle East, Europe, Asia, and Africa. On one occasion a computer in the United States was compromised but, following infection, an uninstaller was launched within hours, which may indicate this victim was infected unintentionally.
#Vault7 linked #Longhorn group infiltrated governments, international orgs, other targets Click to Tweet

The link to Vault 7

A number of documents disclosed by WikiLeaks outline specifications and requirements for malware tools. One document is a development timeline for a piece of malware called Fluxwire, containing a changelog of dates for when new features were incorporated. These dates align closely with the development of one Longhorn tool (Trojan.Corentry) tracked by Symantec. New features in Corentry consistently appeared in samples obtained by Symantec either on the same date listed in the Vault 7 document or several days later, leaving little doubt that Corentry is the malware described in the leaked document.
Early versions of Corentry seen by Symantec contained a reference to the file path for the Fluxwire program database (PDB) file. The Vault 7 document lists removal of the full path for the PDB as one of the changes implemented in Version 3.5.0.
Up until 2014, versions of Corentry were compiled using GCC. According to the Vault 7 document, Fluxwire switched to a MSVC compiler for version 3.3.0 on February 25, 2015. This was reflected in samples of Corentry, where a version compiled on February 25, 2015 had used MSVC as a compiler.
Corentry sample (MD5 hash) Date/time of sample compilation Embedded Corentry version number Corentry compiler Vault 7 changelog number Vault 7 changelog date
N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.1.0 - 2.4.1 Jan 12, 2011 - Feb 28, 2013
e20d5255d8ab1ff5f157847d2f3ffb25 23/08/2013 10:20 3.0.0 GCC 3.0.0 Aug 23, 2013
5df76f1ad59e019e52862585d27f1de2 21/02/2014 11:07 3.1.0 GCC 3.1.0 Feb 20, 2014
318d8b61d642274dd0513c293e535b38 15/05/2014 09:01 3.1.1 GCC 3.1.1 May 14, 2014
N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.2.0 Jul 15, 2014
511a473e26e7f10947561ded8f73ffd0 03/09/2014 00:12 3.2.1 GCC 3.2.1 Aug 18, 2014
c06d422656ca69827f63802667723932 25/02/2015 16:50 N/A MSVC 3.3.0 Feb 25, 2015
N/A N/A N/A N/A 3.3.1 -> 3.5.0 May 17, 2015 -> Nov 13, 2015
Table. Corentry version numbers and compilation dates compared to Fluxwire version numbers and changelog dates disclosed in Vault 7
A second Vault 7 document details Fire and Forget, a specification for user-mode injection of a payload by a tool called Archangel. The specification of the payload and the interface used to load it was closely matched in another Longhorn tool called Backdoor.Plexor.
A third document outlines cryptographic protocols that malware tools should follow. These include the use of inner cryptography within SSL to prevent man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, key exchange once per connection, and use of AES with a 32-bit key. These requirements align with the cryptographic practices observed by Symantec in all of the Longhorn tools.
Other Vault 7 documents outline tradecraft practices to be used, such as use of the Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) as a means of command and control (C&C) communications, employing wipe-on-use as standard practice, in-memory string de-obfuscation, using a unique deployment-time key for string obfuscation, and the use of secure erase protocols involving renaming and overwriting. Symantec has observed Longhorn tools following all of these practices. While other malware families are known to use some of these practices, the fact that so many of them are followed by Longhorn makes it noteworthy.

Global reach: Longhorn’s operations

While active since at least 2011, with some evidence of activity dating back as far as 2007, Longhorn first came to Symantec’s attention in 2014 with the use of a zero-day exploit (CVE-2014-4148) embedded in a Word document to infect a target with Plexor.
The malware had all the hallmarks of a sophisticated cyberespionage group. Aside from access to zero-day exploits, the group had preconfigured Plexor with a proxy address specific to the organization, indicating that they had prior knowledge of the target environment.
To date, Symantec has found evidence of Longhorn activities against 40 targets spread across 16 different countries. Symantec has seen Longhorn use four different malware tools against its targets: Corentry, Plexor, Backdoor.Trojan.LH1, and Backdoor.Trojan.LH2.
Before deploying malware to a target, the Longhorn group will preconfigure it with what appears to be target-specific code words and distinct C&C domains and IP addresses for communications back to the attackers. Longhorn tools have embedded capitalized code words, internally referenced as “groupid” and “siteid”, which may be used to identify campaigns and victims. Over 40 of these identifiers have been observed, and typically follow the theme of movies, characters, food, or music. One example was a nod to the band The Police, with the code words REDLIGHT and ROXANNE used.
Longhorn’s malware has an extensive list of commands for remote control of the infected computer. Most of the malware can also be customized with additional plugins and modules, some of which have been observed by Symantec.
Longhorn’s malware appears to be specifically built for espionage-type operations, with detailed system fingerprinting, discovery, and exfiltration capabilities. The malware uses a high degree of operational security, communicating externally at only select times, with upload limits on exfiltrated data, and randomization of communication intervals—all attempts to stay under the radar during intrusions.
For C&C servers, Longhorn typically configures a specific domain and IP address combination per target. The domains appear to be registered by the attackers; however they use privacy services to hide their real identity. The IP addresses are typically owned by legitimate companies offering virtual private server (VPS) or webhosting services. The malware communicates with C&C servers over HTTPS using a custom underlying cryptographic protocol to protect communications from identification.
Prior to the Vault 7 leak, Symantec’s assessment of Longhorn was that it was a well-resourced organization which was involved in intelligence gathering operations. This assessment was based on its global range of targets and access to a range of comprehensively developed malware and zero-day exploits. The group appeared to work a standard Monday to Friday working week, based on timestamps and domain name registration dates, behavior which is consistent with state-sponsored groups.
Symantec’s analysis uncovered a number of indicators that Longhorn was from an English-speaking, North American country. The acronym MTWRFSU (Monday Tuesday Wednesday ThuRsday Friday Saturday SUnday) was used to configure which day of the week malware would communicate with the attackers. This acronym is common in academic calendars in North America. Some of the code words found in the malware, such as SCOOBYSNACK, would be most familiar in North America. In addition to this, the compilation times of tools with reliable timestamps indicate a time zone in the Americas.

Distinctive fingerprints

Longhorn has used advanced malware tools and zero-day vulnerabilities to infiltrate a string of targets worldwide. Taken in combination, the tools, techniques, and procedures employed by Longhorn are distinctive and unique to this group, leaving little doubt about its link to Vault 7.
Throughout its investigation of Longhorn, Symantec’s priority has been protection of its customers. Through identifying different strains of Longhorn malware, connecting them to a single actor, and learning more about the group’s tactics and procedures, Symantec has been able to better defend customer organizations against this and similar threats. In publishing this new information, Symantec’s goal remains unchanged: to reassure customers that it is aware of this threat and actively working to protect them from it.

Protection

Symantec and Norton products protect against Longhorn malware with the following detections:

 By: Symantec Security Response Symantec Employee

Monday, March 13, 2017

Pre-Installed Android Malware Found On 36 High-end Smartphones


android-malware-apps
Bought a brand new Android Smartphone? Do not expect it to be a clean slate.

At least 36 high-end smartphone models belonging to popular manufacturing companies such as Samsung, LG, Xiaomi, Asus, Nexus, Oppo, and Lenovo, which are being distributed by two unidentified companies have been found pre-loaded with malware programs.

These malware infected devices were identified after a Check Point malware scan was performed on Android devices. Two malware families were detected on the infected devices: Loki and SLocker.

According to a blog post published Friday by Check Point researchers, these malicious software apps were not part of the official ROM firmware supplied by the smartphone manufacturers but were installed later somewhere along the supply chain, before the handsets arrived at the two companies from the manufacturer's factory.

First seen in February 2016, Loki Trojan inject devices right inside core Android operating system processes to gain powerful root privileges. The trojan also includes spyware-like features, such as grabbing the list of current applications, browser history, contact list, call history, and location data.

On the other hand, SLocker is a mobile ransomware that locks victims devices for ransom and communicates through Tor in order to hide the identity of its operators.

List of Popular Smartphones Infected with Malware


Here's the list of infected smartphones:

  • Galaxy Note 2
  • LG G4
  • Galaxy S7
  • Galaxy S4
  • Galaxy Note 4
  • Galaxy Note 5
  • Xiaomi Mi 4i
  • Galaxy A5
  • ZTE x500
  • Galaxy Note 3
  • Galaxy Note Edge
  • Galaxy Tab S2
  • Galaxy Tab 2
  • Oppo N3
  • Vivo X6 plus
  • Nexus 5
  • Nexus 5X
  • Asus Zenfone 2
  • LenovoS90
  • OppoR7 plus
  • Xiaomi Redmi
  • Lenovo A850

The malware backdoor offers its operator unrestricted access to these infected devices, from downloading, installing and activating Android malicious apps, deleting user data, uninstalling security software and disabling system apps, to dialing premium phone numbers.

This incident underscores the dangers of untrusted supply chains, and experts are quite worried about the security of the supply chain with reports of over 20 incidents where rogue retailers have managed to pre-install malware on new Android handsets.

Here's How to Remove the Malware Infections:


Since the malware programs were installed to the device's ROM using system privileges, it's hard to get rid of the infections.

To remove the malware from the infected devices, either you can root your device and uninstall the malware apps easily, or you would need to completely reinstall the phone firmware/ROM via a process called "Flashing."

Flashing is a complex process, and it is recommended that users power off their device and approach a certified technician/mobile service provider.

It's not the first time when high-end smartphones have been shipped pre-installed with malicious apps that can covertly siphon sensitive user data.

In December last year, certain low-cost Android smartphones and tablets were found to be shipped with malicious firmware that covertly gathered data about the infected devices, displays ads on top of running apps and downloads unwanted APKs on the victim's devices.

In November, researchers discovered a hidden backdoor in the AdUps firmware of over 700 Million Android smartphones, which also covertly gathered data on phone owners and sent it to a Chinese server without the user's knowledge.

Meanwhile, a flaw in the Ragentek firmware used by certain low-cost Android devices was also discovered that allowed attackers to remotely execute malicious code with root privileges, turning over full control of the devices to hackers. 
 
by Wang Wei

Friday, March 3, 2017

How Fast Is Falling Rain?

How Fast Is Falling Rain?

Read a random fact yesterday that said the “average rain drop falls at 17mph.” Is that reasonable?
Let the physics begin. You might think: hey, wont’ the speed depend on how high the water started? Well, it would if air resistance on the water drop were not important. However, I suspect that the rain will fall at terminal velocity. Terminal velocity is the case when the air resistance on the object is equal to the gravitational force on the object. When this happens, the net force is zero (the zero vector) and the object falls at a constant speed.
Here is a diagram of a water drop at terminal speed.
Untitled 1
Since the air resistance force depends on the speed of the object (but the gravitational force does not), there is one speed for which these two forces add up to the zero vector. Near the surface of the Earth, the magnitude of the gravitational force can be modeled as:
La te xi t 1 4
Where g is the local gravitational field (not the acceleration due to gravity – that is a non-good name for it). And what about the air resistance? It can probably be modeled as:
La te xi t 1 5
Where:
  • ρ is the density of air (about 1.2 kg/m3).
  • A is the cross-sectional area of the object. If the object was a sphere, this area would be the area of a circle.
  • C is the drag coefficient. This depends on the shape of the object. A cone and a flat circle will have the same A, but different drag coefficients.
  • v is the magnitude of the velocity of the object with respect to the air.
  • It won’t matter for this case too much, but the direction of the air resistance force is in the opposite direction to the velocity.
At terminal velocity, the magnitudes of these two forces will be equal. I can write that as:
La te xi t 1 6
Now, what about the mass (m)? Let me assume that it is made of water (like most rain) and is spherical (even though that is not likely – it would probably be “rain drop shaped”). If I call the density of water ρw and the radius of the drop r, then the mass would be:
La te xi t 1 7
Putting this into the “weight = air resistance” expression above as well as an expression for the cross-sectional area in terms of r, I get:
La te xi t 1 8
The cool thing here is that the terminal speed of the water drop depends on the size (radius). Larger drops will have a larger terminal velocity. So, could you just make a water melon sized water drop? No. Why not? Because at some point, the force from the air on the drop is going to break the water drop apart. The surface tension holding the drop together just won’t be enough to maintain its drop status.
Then how big can it get? I have no idea. Oh, and then there is the problem of real drop instead of spherical drops. Let me look at that first. Wikipedia lists the coefficient of drag for a smooth sphere as 0.1. A rain drop should be less than this – but how much less? Well, a rain drop would take some of the water to form some sort of tail. This would decrease the cross sectional area as well as decrease the drag coefficient. I am not sure how to calculate the volume of a non-spherical rain drop, so for now I will just use a spherical drop with a drag coefficient of 0.08. I know that is wrong, but it will give me an idea about the terminal speed.
Now, how big should it be? How about I don’t decide. Instead I will plot the terminal speed for a range of rain drop sizes. Let me look at drops from 0.5 mm to 5 mm. Here is that plot.
Raindrop.png
Well, the original question asked about the speeds in units of miles per hour. Here is the same plot but with different units.
Raindrop 2.png
Based on my estimations, 17 mph would be on the low end – but possible. It could be likely that I grossly overestimated the size of a raindrop.
Homework: Yes, there is homework. If the rain drop has a radius of 0.5 mm, from how high would it have to drop to get pretty close to the terminal velocity?

Update

As usual, I rush into things without exploring things in more depth. My assumption of a raindrop shaped raindrop appears to be bogus. Who would have guessed that? Anyway, here are some very useful links from commenters (Jens and Charles) and a large thanks to them.
By David Cox (@dcox21)